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Abstract
We study a vertically differentiated market where two firms simultaneously choose the
quality and price of the good they sell and where consumers also care for the average
quality of the goods supplied. Firms are composed of two factions whose objectives dif-
fer: one is maximizing profit while the other maximizes revenues. The equilibrium con-
cept we model, called Firm Unanimity Nash Equilibrium (FUNE), corresponds to Nash
equilibria between firms when there is efficient bargaining between the two factions in-
side both firms. One conceptual advantage of FUNE is that oligopolistic equilibria exist
in pure strategies, even though the strategy space (price, quality) is multi-dimensional.
We first show that such equilibria are inefficient, with both firms underproviding
quality. We then assume that the government takes a participation in one firm, which
introduces a third faction, bent on welfare maximization, in that firm. We study the
characteristics of equilibria as a function of the extent of government’s participation.
Our main results are twofold. First, government’s participation in the firm providing
the low quality good decreases efficiency while participation in the firm providing the
high quality good increases efficiency. Second, the optimal degree of government’s par-
ticipation in the high-quality firm increases with how much consumers care for average
equality.
Key words: mixed oligopoly, vertical differentiation, factions, party-unanimity
Nash equilibrium.
JEL Classification: D21, D43, D62, H82.
1 Introduction
In many countries and many sectors of activity, competing firms exhibit different ob-
jectives. This is the case for instance where private, profit-maximizing firms compete
with public firms, or with private non-profit firms. Examples range from network in-
dustries (energy, transportation, telecommunications) to the service sectors (banking,
insurance), and from health care provision to education.1 The objective of the mixed
oligopoly literature is precisely to analyze equilibria in industries with competition be-
tween a small number of firms whose objectives differ. Until recently, most of the
literature has focused on the particular case where a private, profit-maximizing firm
competes with a public, welfare-maximizing firm. The papers differ mainly in the tim-
ing of the game played by the firms (simultaneous or sequential), and in their control
variables (quantity or price).
Recent papers like those of Matsumura (1998) and White (2002) assume that a firm
may be semi-public, in which case it maximizes a convex combination of profit and
welfare. The typical result obtained is a kind of “paradox”, like showing that profit
would have been higher if the firm maximized welfare rather than profit. Those results
are driven by the strategic interactions between firms.
To the best of our knowledge, all papers up to now assume that the objective func-
tions of the firms are exogenous. More precisely, each firm is treated as a unitary actor
which is exogenously endowed with some objective. There is no attempt to try to model
how firms make decisions, and why they would end up with an objective like a convex
combination of profit and surplus. We believe that this depiction of the working of
firms is incomplete and may be misleading. For instance, Seabright (2004) contends
that “Firms in America or Western Europe are coalitions, products of the eighteenth
century political theory of checks and balances that underlies the American Constitu-
tion. (p.172)”.
Our contribution is to model both the decisions within firms and the competition
between firms. We assume that firms are composed of different factions. One faction
1Parris, Pestieau and Saynor (1987) contains a quantitative description of the importance of public
firms in Western Europe.
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represents the interest of the owners, who want to maximize profit. The other faction
is composed of managers, whose interests are not perfectly aligned with the owners.
We assume that managers maximize revenue, and one can think of several reasons
why this may be so, like ego-rents, career concerns (heading the largest firm in an
industry means being highly visible), “empire building” temptations, etc. We do not
model the principal-agent relationship between owners and managers, but rather assume
that decisions within a firm are taken through some form of bargaining between profit-
motivated and revenue-motivated agents. As a first step, we are agnostic as to the
particular form this bargaining takes, and we only assume that this bargaining is efficient
(i.e., it results in an allocation on the Pareto frontier for the two factions inside a
firm, given the decision taken by other firms in the industry). A Firm Unanimity
Nash Equilibrium (or FUNE) is then a Nash equilibrium between firms coupled with
unanimity between factions inside firms – i.e., a vector of firms’ actions such that no
other action would simultaneously increase both profit and revenue for any firm, given
the actions taken by the other firms.
We apply this novel equilibrium concept2 to the following setting. We assume that
two firms offer a vertically differentiated good and that they simultaneously choose the
quality and price of the good they offer. We assume that customers care not only about
the characteristics (quality and price) of the good they buy, but also about the average
quality of the goods consumed. The illustration we have in mind is pollution, with people
caring about the average fuel mileage of cars for instance. The individual decision as to
which good to buy then exerts a consumption externality on other individuals.
FUNE represents, we hope somewhat more realistically than the traditional ap-
proach, what takes place within firms. But there is as well a mathematical payoff to
using this equilibrium concept: although firms are competing on a two-dimensional
strategy space (price and quality), equilibria exist in pure strategies. Typically, on such
a strategy space, if the firms have a single goal (e.g., profit maximization), pure-strategy
equilibria do not exist. To achieve existence, authors have resorted to postulating the
2FUNE is an adaptation of the concept of party unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE), proposed
by one of us in the study of political competition (Roemer (1999, 2001)). There, political parties are
composed of factions with different goals.
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use of mixed strategies, or specifying the game as one with stages. We believe that either
resorting to mixed strategies or stage games is a compromise that is difficult to justify;
it is conceptually preferable to model oligopolistic competition as a simultaneous move,
pure-strategy game. FUNE thus complexifies the conception of what happens inside a
firm, in exchange for an intellectually satisfying simplicity in the nature of inter-firm
competition.
We start by computing the FUNEs in our setting. There is a two-dimensional man-
ifold of FUNEs, which can be characterized according to the relative bargaining weight
of the revenue-maximizing faction in both firms. We analyze the welfare properties
of these equilibria and find that they fall short of optimality. This is not surprising
since two assumptions of the fundamental welfare theorems are not satisfied: perfect
competition and complete markets.
We then add more structure to the intra-firm bargaining by providing an explana-
tion as to how the bargaining weights should be determined at equilibrium. We assume
that available managers differ in quality, and that higher-quality managers are attracted
by firms generating larger revenues. The quality of the managers affects the bargaining
weight of the revenue-maximizing faction, and thus the equilibrium revenues and profits
obtained by both firms. We find the unique fixed point of this game, where the quality
of the managers attracted in both firms is compatible with the revenues obtained at
equilibrium, and where these revenues correspond to the (unique) FUNE with the bar-
gaining weights implied by the managers’ quality. We keep this FUNE, characterized
by the relative bargaining weights between revenue and profit-maximizing factions in
both firms, in the rest of the paper.
The public intervention we study takes the form of the government’s taking a par-
ticipation in one firm. Since it owns part of the firm, the government is entitled to
designate a fraction of the directors on the board. We model this as the introduction of
a third faction in this firm, with welfare maximization as its objective. To understand
the impact of various levels of government intervention, we keep constant the relative
bargaining weights between profit- and revenue-maximizing factions in both firms and
assume that the bargaining weight of the welfare-maximizing faction increases with (or
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is a proxy for) the extent of government’s participation. A single FUNE corresponds to
each vector of bargaining weights, and we study the normative properties of these equi-
libria as a function of the extent of the government’s intervention in the firm. Finally, we
study how these normative properties are modified when the intensity of the consump-
tion externality is varied, and when the identity of the firm in which the government
invests is modified.
Our main results are as follows. First, in the absence of government intervention,
the quality levels provided by both firms are too low, even when there is no consumption
externality. Moreover, too many people consume the high quality good. The efficiency of
the FUNEs (measured as the total surplus generated by any FUNE allocation compared
to the maximum surplus attainable) varies from roughly 50% to 70%. Second, total
surplus increases monotonically with the welfare maximizers’ bargaining weight in the
high quality firm when the externality intensity is large enough. If this externality is very
low, total surplus reaches a maximum for an interior value of the welfare maximizers’
bargaining weight. Third, we also analyze the situation where the government takes
a participation in the low quality firm, and we obtain that total surplus decreases
monotonically with the bargaining weight of surplus maximizers! Both qualities decrease
with the bargaining weight of the welfare-maximizing faction, moving away from their
optimal level. Also, the allocation of consumers across goods worsens as this bargaining
weight increases: more and more people buy the high quality good, while optimality
would call for fewer buying this good.
2 The model
There is a continuum of consumers, indexed by λ, distributed according to the distribu-
tion function F on [0,∞[, with density denoted by f . We denote by λ¯ the average value
of λ and by λmed its median value. Each consumer buys one unit of a good of quality
q, and has a utility function
V (q, p, q¯;λ) = λq + γλq¯ − p (1)
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where q¯ is the average quality consumed and p the price. The second term denotes the
environmental externality: each individual’s utility increases with the average quality
of the goods consumed (for instance, the average pollution or fuel mileage of cars). We
assume for simplicity that all individuals share the same γ ∈ [0, 1]– i.e., that they have
the same relative valuation for average quality (although absolute variation γλ varies
across individuals).
There are two firms (indexed by subscript i = 1, 2), each providing one good. They
share the same cost function, which is linear in quantity and convex in quality: c(q)
denotes the per unit (of quantity) cost of providing a good of quality q. We assume
without loss of generality that q1 > q2 and we call firm 1 the high quality firm.
When choosing from which firm to buy, individuals do not consider their (infinites-
imal) impact on the average quantity of the good consumed. Individual λ then buys
from firm 1 if
λq1 − p1 > λq2 − p2
i.e., if
λ >
p1 − p2
q1 − q2
= λ∗(p1, q1, p2, q2).
We then obtain that
q¯ =
λ∗Z
0
q2f(λ)dλ+
1Z
λ∗
q1f(λ)dλ.
In each firm, two factions coexist, one maximizing profit while the other maximizes
revenue. Profit in firm i = 1, 2 is given by
Π1(p1, q1, p2, q2) = [p1 − c(q1)] (1− F (λ∗)) ,
Π2(p1, q1, p2, q2) = [p2 − c(q2)]F (λ∗),
while revenue is given by
R1(p1, q1, p2, q2) = p1 (1− F (λ∗)) ,
R2(p1, q1, p2, q2) = p2F (λ∗).
We now introduce our equilibrium concept.
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Definition 1 A Firm Unanimity Nash Equilibrium (FUNE) is a vector (p1, q1, p2, q2)
such that
(i) @(p01, q01) such that Π1(p01, q01, p2, q2) ≥ Π1(p1, q1, p2, q2) and
R1(p01, q01, p2, q2) ≥ R1(p1, q1, p2, q2) with at least one strict inequality, and
(ii) @(p02, q02) such that Π2(p1, q1, p02, q02) ≥ Π2(p1, q1, p2, q2)
and R2(p1, q1, p02, q02) ≥ R2(p1, q1, p2, q2) with at least one strict inequality.
In words, no firm can find another pair of price and quality that would strictly
increase one of its factions’ objectives (revenue or profit) without decreasing its other
faction’s objective.
It will prove easier in the paper to use a slightly different definition of FUNEs. We
introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 1 log(Π1(p, q, p2, q2)), log(R1(p, q, p2, q2)), log(Π2(p1, q1, p, q))
and log(R2(p1, q1, p, q)) are concave in (p, q).
Roemer (2001, Theorem 8.2.) proves that, if Assumption 1 holds, then any FUNE
is also a weighted Nash bargaining solution. We assume from now on that Assumption
1 holds and we make use of the following definition:
Definition 2 A FUNE is a vector (p1, q1, p2, q2) and a pair (a1, a2) ∈ [0, 1]2 such that
(i) given (p1, q1), (p2, q2) = argmax (Π2(p1, q1, p2, q2))a2 (R2(p1, q1, p2, q2))1−a2 , and
(ii) given (p2, q2), (p1, q1) = argmax (Π1(p1, q1, p2, q2))a1 (R1(p1, q1, p2, q2))1−a1 .
The first order conditions for firm 1 at a FUNE are3
a1
Π1
∇1Π1 +
1− a1
R1
∇1R1 = 0,
where
∇1Π1 =
µ
∂Π1
∂p1
,
∂Π1
∂q1
¶
.
3 In order to save on notation, we do not report the arguments for the profit and revenue functions
from now on.
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These first order conditions can be expanded to obtain
1− a1
a1
=
R1
Π1
1− F (λ∗)− [p1 − c(q1)] f(λ∗)∂λ
∗
∂p1
F (λ∗)− 1 + p1f(λ∗)∂λ
∗
∂p1
, (2)
1− a1
a1
=
R1
Π1
−c0(q1) (1− F (λ∗))− [p1 − c(q1)] f(λ∗)∂λ
∗
∂q1
p1f(λ∗)∂λ
∗
∂q1
, (3)
with
∂λ∗
∂p1
=
1
q1 − q2
> 0
∂λ∗
∂q1
= − p1 − p2
(q1 − q2)2
< 0.
The first order conditions for firm 2 are obtained similarly.
We prove the following interesting results.
Proposition 1 Let c(q) = δqr and r ≥ 1. Let λˆ be the solution of the equation
r − 1
r
λˆ =
1− 2F (λˆ)
f(λˆ)
.
Then, in all FUNEs, λ∗(p1, q1, p2, q2) = λˆ.
Proof: See Appendix
Remark. The proposition immediately implies the following.
1. If r = 1, then exactly one-half of the population purchases the high (low) quality
good at any FUNE.
2. Let the distribution F be uniform, on any support. Then the fraction of the
population who purchase the low quality good, at any FUNE, is a decreasing function
of r, approaching one-third of the population in the limit as r becomes large.
We now look at the Pareto efficient allocations in order to compare them with FUNE
allocations. Pareto allocations are defined by the triple (q1, q2, λ˜). It is easy to see that
the high quality good is supplied to all λ > λ˜ and the low quality good to all λ < λ˜.
This is done with a simple “switching” argument: if λ1 > λ2 but λ1 consumes the low
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quality good while λ2 consumes the high quality good, then a trade with side payment
can be arranged making both better off.
The usual argument from quasi-linearity shows that Pareto efficiency requires max-
imization of the sum of consumer surplus and firms’ profits
W =
λ˜Z
0
q2λdF (λ) +
∞Z
λ˜
q1λdF (λ) + γλ¯q¯ − c(q1)(1− F (λ˜))− c(q2)F (λ˜) (4)
where q¯ = q2F (λ˜)+ q1(1−F (λ˜)).We assume from now on in the paper that c(q) = δq2.
A Pareto optimal allocation (q1, q2,λ˜) that maximizes W solves the following first order
conditions:
∂W
∂λ˜
= f(λ˜)
h³
λ˜+ γλ¯
´
(q2 − q1)− (c(q2)− c(q1))
i
, (5)
∂W
∂q1
=
∞Z
λ˜
λdF (λ) + γλ¯(1− F (λ˜))− (1− F (λ˜))c0(q1), (6)
∂W
∂q2
=
λ˜Z
0
λdF (λ) + γλ¯F (λ˜)− F (λ˜)c0(q2), (7)
We start by examining separately the optimality formulas for the allocation of consumers
across goods and for qualities. Equation (5) gives
λ˜ = δ(
q2 + q1
2
)− γλ¯. (8)
This result is very intuitive: for given quality levels, caring for pollution (γ > 0) induces
provision of the high quality good to more people. We will see in a short while how this
result is modified when quality levels are set at their optimal level at the same time as
the value of λ. As for qualities, putting together (6) and (7), we obtain
λ¯(1 + γ) = δq¯, (9)
whose intuition is also straightforward: optimal qualities equalize average preferences
for quality (including the pollution aspect) and average marginal cost of quality.
We now look at the simultaneous determination of λ and of qualities. Using (9)
together with (5) gives
λ˜ = λ¯+ δ(
q2 + q1
2
− q¯).
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We then obtain that λ˜ = λ¯ if and only if λ¯ = λmed. Moreover, with a positively skewed
distribution, we have either λ˜ > λ¯ or λ˜ < λmed – i.e., the only configuration excluded
is λmed < λ˜ < λ¯.
Finally, observe from (6) and (7) that
q2 + q1 =
1
δ
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
2γλ¯+
∞R˜
λ
λdF (λ)
1− F (λ˜)
+
λ˜R
0
λdF (λ)
F (λ˜)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
so that by (8)
λ˜ =
1
2
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∞R˜
λ
λdF (λ)
1− F (λ˜)
+
λ˜R
0
λdF (λ)
F (λ˜)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(10)
which does not depend either on δ nor on γ! In words, the Pareto efficient allocation
of consumers across goods does not depend on the intensity of the externality when
qualities are set at their optimal level. Comparing equation (10) and Proposition 1, we
see that the goods’ allocation in FUNEs is generically not optimal. Moreover, we also
have that the optimal difference between quality levels, q1− q2, is independent of δ and
of γ, since both q1 and q2 increase by the same amount with γ and decrease by the same
amount with δ.
We now turn to numerical simulations in order to shed more light on the FUNE
allocations and on their normative properties.
3 FUNEs without government intervention: general prop-
erties
We study numerically4 FUNEs with a lognormal distribution of λ such that λ¯=40 and
λmed=30 while c(q) = q2/3. We obtain a bidimensional manifold of FUNEs. This
manifold is depicted in the (price, quality) space on Figure 1. Figure 1 depicts 3800
4Finding FUNEs requires solving 4 equations (first order conditions (2) and (3) for firm 1, and similar
equations for firm 2) in 6 unknowns (p1, q1, p2, q2, a1 and a2). We randomly draw a very large number
of pairs (a1, a2) and attempt to solve for the other 4 unknowns. We also check that the second order
conditions are satisfied.
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FUNEs which have been sorted by increasing order of the high quality price. Each
FUNE vector (p1, q1, p2, q2) is plotted with the same color, that goes smoothly from
blue for the lowest values of p1 to red for its highest values. The ordered pairs (pi, qi)
on the diagonal of the price-quality plane are associated with the high quality firm 1,
and the ones on the semi-circle are associated with the low quality firm 2. We see there
are FUNEs where the two firms play strategies that are close to one another (the blue
FUNEs) and ones where they play strategies that are very different (the red end of the
spectrum).
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
The main regularities obtained (in all FUNEs) are as follows:
• Profit is lower in firm 1 (the firm producing the high quality good) than in firm 2.
• Revenue is larger in firm 1 than in firm 2.
• The relative bargaining power of the revenue-maximizers, αi = (1− ai) /ai, is
higher in firm 1 than in firm 2: α1 > α2. Moreover, in all FUNEs, α1 > 1 – i.e.,
the revenue-maximizers have more bargaining power than the profit-maximizers
in firm 1 in all FUNEs.
The next Result summarizes the descriptive characteristics of the FUNEs:
Result 1 In all FUNEs, profit is lower and revenue is larger in the high quality firm,
while the relative bargaining weight of the revenue maximizers is larger in that firm than
in the low quality firm.
We now turn to the normative properties of the FUNEs. We obtain the following
regularities:
• The qualities offered by both firms at equilibrium are lower than the optimal
qualities, whatever the value of γ. The high quality good is especially deficient
(its value varies from 38 to 66 in FUNEs while its optimal values goes from 160
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Figure 1 : FUNEs in the HPrice, QualityL space
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for γ=0 to 220 for γ=1; the low quality level varies from 35.7 to 42.5 in FUNEs
while its optimal value goes from 43.6 for γ=0 to 103.6 for γ=1).
• Proposition 1 has shown that the equilibrium market share (in volume) F [λ∗] is
the same in all FUNEs and is not affected by the value of γ. We also know that
the optimal market share is not affected by γ either. Comparing both, we obtain
that too many people consume the high quality good in all FUNEs, compared to
the global optimum: 62.5% vs 14.2%.
• The average quality of goods sold in all FUNEs is lower than the optimal average
quality, whatever the intensity of the externality: the first effect mentioned above
(both qualities are too low) is larger than the second one (too many people buying
the high quality good).
We summarize the normative properties of the FUNEs in the following Result:
Result 2 In all FUNEs, and whatever the value of the externality intensity λ, the
qualities offered by both firms as well as the average quality provided are lower than
optimal, while too many people consume the high quality good.
We measure the efficiency of a FUNE by dividing total surplus in that equilibrium
by the maximum surplus attainable (the one corresponding to the optimal qualities and
market shares). Table 1 summarizes the results we obtain.
Table 1: Efficiency of FUNEs as a function of γ.
Efficiency: minimum maximum average
γ = 1 47.9% 70.8% 55.8%
γ = 0.5 55.5% 76.7% 63.3%
γ = 0.25 58.7% 76% 65.8%
γ = 0 59.6% 68.8% 64.8%
The second column in Table 1 gives the minimum efficiency attained over the set
of FUNEs, the third column the maximum efficiency and the last column the average
efficiency across FUNEs, assuming that they are all equiprobable. We obtain that FU-
NEs are far from optimal even in absence of externalities (γ = 0). While the minimum
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efficiency is monotonically decreasing with the intensity of the externality, it is not the
case for the maximum as well as the average efficiency. Clearly, the average efficiency
depends on the assumption that all FUNEs are equiprobable, which is a very crude one.
For instance, Lee et al. (2005), which uses a solution concept similar to FUNEs but
applied to political competition, computes a kernel density function of the bargaining
powers (which are the unknown parameters in our problem) to control for the fact that
some regions of bargaining-power-space may occur much more frequently than others.
Rather than following this kernel density approach, we proceed here by selecting one
FUNE by endogeneizing the factions’ bargaining weights inside both firms.
4 Endogenous bargaining weights
Up to now, we have not provided any explanation as to why intra-firms bargaining
powers are what they are at equilibrium. In other words, any pair of bargaining powers
consistent with Definition 2 constitutes, together with the associated vector of prices
and qualities, a FUNE. This is the reason why we obtain a two-dimensional manifold
of FUNEs. In this section, we open the bargaining powers’ “black box” and provide an
explanation as to how their value is determined. Providing such an explanation has an
obvious interest by itself. Moreover, it will allow us to narrow down the set of equilibria
and indeed to obtain unicity.
We assume that there is a pool of available managers, and that these managers differ
in some attribute that we call for the moment “quality”. The average quality of this
pool is denoted by μ. One half of the managers ends up working in each of the two
firms, so if we denote the average quality level of the managers in firm i by μi, we obtain
that
μ1
2
+
μ2
2
= μ.
Managers are attracted by firms generating a higher revenue level, for the reasons in-
dicated in the introduction (ego rents, etc.). Since managers have to choose between
two firms, the average quality of the managers attracted in firm i will be an increasing
function of the revenue share (or market share in value) ri = Ri/(R1+R2) of this firm.
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This relationship, which is like a supply function for managerial quality, is summarized
by the following increasing function
Q(ri) = μi, i = 1, 2,
with Q(r1) + Q(r2) = μ. It should be plain that Q(0.5) = μ and that the steeper the
slope of Q, the more mobile the managers.
We need to define what difference the managers’ quality makes in each firm. We
assume that managers’ quality affects the relative bargaining weights of the two factions
in each firm. Now, we have that, in all FUNEs, revenue is higher in the firm where
the relative bargaining power of the revenue-maximizers is larger than in the other
firm. We make the assumption that the relative bargaining weight of the revenue-
maximizing faction is increasing in the average quality of the managers in that firm.
In that sense, one could talk of manager’s cleverness or efficiency, rather than quality,
with cleverer/more efficient managers better able to play the boardroom games in order
to reinforce their bargaining power as revenue maximizers. Formally, we assume that
the relative bargaining weight of the revenue-maximizers is increasing in the managers’
quality and represented by the function a(μi).
A FUNE with endogenous bargaining weights (eFUNE) is then a FUNE with the
additional requirements that (i) the relative bargaining weight of the revenue-maximizers
in each firm is obtained from the average quality of the managers in this firm and (ii)
the average quality of the managers in each firm is a function of the equilibrium revenue
shares of the firms. Formally,
Definition 3 A FUNE with endogenous bargaining weight (eFUNE) is a vector (p1, q1, p2, q2),
a pair (a1, a2) ∈ [0, 1]2 and an assignment of managers of quality μi to firm i such that
(i) given (p1, q1), (p2, q2) = argmax (Π2)a2 (R2)1−a2 ,
(ii) given (p2, q2), (p1, q1) = argmax (Π1)a1 (R1)1−a1 ,
(iii) Q( RiR1+R2 ) = μi, i = 1, 2,
(iv) ai = a(μi), i = 1, 2.
Generally, there will be locally unique such equilibria, if they exist at all. The
unicity argument can be seen from looking at the following mapping: starting from an
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allocation of managers (μ1,μ2), the function a(μi) give the relative bargaining weight
in each firm, from which we obtain the corresponding FUNE (which satisfies equations
(i) and (ii) in the above definition). We then obtain the revenue share of both firms,
which in turn allows us to compute the equilibrium average qualities of managers in
both firms via the equation Q(ri). We are looking for a fixed point of this mapping.
The existence problem comes from the fact that there may exist pairs (μ1,μ2) for which
no FUNE exists.
We use the following functional forms in our simulations: μ = 1, Q(ri) = 2ri and
a(μi) = 1/(1 + 5μ3i ), so that α(μi) = 5μ
3
i . We obtain a unique eFUNE, with p1=804,
q1=48.4, p2=617, q2=40.5, Π1 = 14.5, R1 = 503, Π2 =26.8, R2=231.5, r1=68.5%,
α1=12.85 and α2=1.25. Note that the equilibrium eFUNE qualities are close to the
average qualities obtained in all FUNEs assuming that they are all equi-probable (which
are 46 for firm 1 and 42.5 for firm 2).
We keep this eFUNE, characterized by the relative bargaining weights between
revenue-and profit-maximizing factions in both firms, in the rest of the paper.
5 Government intervention in the high quality firm
From now on, we study the impact of public intervention into this industry. Public
intervention is justified by the unappealing normative properties of FUNEs (see section
3 and especially Table 1), and could take several forms. We focus on one public in-
tervention, namely the government’s taking a participation in one firm.5 This section
and the next one study participations in the high-quality firm (firm 1) while section 7
studies participation in the low quality firm. Taking a participation in a firm allows the
government to appoint a fraction of the managers (or directors) of that firm. In our
setting, this means that government intervention introduces a third faction into firm 1.
We assume a benevolent government, so that the third faction maximizes total welfare
5We assume that there is no government expenditures associated to taking a participation in the
firm. We could easily introduce such expenditures by assuming that the government buys shares on
the market. The price of these shares would then be related to the profit level attained by that firm
before government intervention – i.e., at the eFUNE obtained in the previous section. Note that such
expenditures (which constitute a transfer between government and the firm’s private owners) would not
affect our normative analysis as long as we maximize unweighted surplus.
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W in the economy, as given by equation (4). The three factions bargain with each other
when deciding about the price and quality of the good offered by firm 1. As previously,
each faction is characterized by a bargaining weight inside the firm.
Formally, we have that
Definition 4 A FUNE with government intervention in firm 1 (FUNE-G1) is a vector
(p1, q1, p2, q2), a triple (a1, b1, a2) ∈ [0, 1]3 with (a1, b1, a1 + b1, a2) ∈ [0, 1]4 such that
(i) given (p1, q1), (p2, q2) = argmax (Π2)a2 (R2)1−a2 ,
(ii) given (p2, q2), (p1, q1) = argmax (Π1)a1 (R1)1−a1−b1 (W )b1 where W is given by
equation (4).
Our objective is to study the impact on the industry equilibrium of the government
taking a participation in the high quality firm. To do so, we need to relate the extent
of the public participation in firm 1 to the bargaining weight of the welfare maximizing
faction, b1. We assume a monotone increasing relationship, so that we can concentrate
on the bargaining weight of this faction.
Our benchmark situation is the eFUNE without government intervention obtained in
the previous section. To concentrate on the impact of government intervention, we keep
the relative bargaining weight of the profit- and revenue-maximizing factions constant
in both firms as we increase the bargaining weight of the welfare-maximizers in firm 1.
That is, we keep both (1 − a2)/a2 and (1 − a1 − b1)/a1 constant at the level reached
in the unique eFUNE (resp. 1.25 and 12.85) and study the FUNE-G1 associated with
each value of b1. To each value of b1 is associated (at most) one FUNE-G1. Finally, we
assume that the intensity of the externality is such that γ = 1 in equation (1).
We obtain6 that a FUNE-G1 exists for all values of the bargaining weight of the
welfare-maximizing faction b1 ∈ [0, 1]. As b1 increases, we have that
• the quality offered by both firms increases monotonically and moves closer to the
optimal qualities: q1 increases from 48.4 to 112.8 when b1 goes from 0 to 1 (the
6Finding FUNE-G1s requires solving 4 equations (first order conditions with respect to price and
quality for statements (i) —for firm 2— and (ii) —for firm 1— in Definition 4) in 5 unknowns (p1, q1, p2, q2
and b1), given that we keep a2 and (1− a1− b1)/a1 constant at the level reached in the unique eFUNE.
We choose a value for b1 and solve for the other 4 unknowns. We also check that the second order
conditions are satisfied.
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Figure 2: Efficiency of FUNE-G1 as a function of b1 when γ = 1.
optimal value of q1 is 220) while q2 increases from 40.5 to 81.4 (while the optimal
value of q2 is 103.6);
• the proportion of people buying the low quality good increases (from 37.5% for
b1=0 to 63.8% for b1 = 1) and moves closer to the optimal proportion, 85.8%;
• the efficiency of the FUNE-G1 increases monotonically, from 56% to 91% (see
Figure 2).
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
We summarize all this in the next Result:
Result 3 As the bargaining weight of the welfare maximizing faction in the high qual-
ity firm increases, the efficiency of the corresponding FUNE-G1 allocation increases
monotonically, with the qualities of both goods increasing and moving closer to their
optimal levels, while the proportion of people buying the low quality good increases and
also moves closer to its optimal level.
We thus obtain not only that the government taking a participation (by which we
mean introducing a third faction bent on maximizing welfare) in the high quality firm
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helps increasing the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation, but also that efficiency is
monotonically increasing in the bargaining weight of the welfare maximizers. Observe
nevertheless that full nationalization falls short of reaching the Pareto optimal alloca-
tion, with the low quality firm run by revenue and profit-maximizing factions only.
6 The impact of the externality intensity
In this section, we test the robustness of the results obtained in the previous section
to variations in the externality intensity (the value of parameter γ in equation (1)).
Note first that the value of γ does not impact the set of FUNEs without government
intervention, nor the eFUNE we selected. We thus start from the same eFUNE as in the
previous section. On the other hand, γ impacts the efficiency reached in this eFUNE,
and also the FUNE-G1 corresponding to any value of b1.
We have proceeded in the same way as in the previous section, starting from the
eFUNE obtained in section 4 and maintaining constant the relative bargaining weights
of the profit and revenue-maximizing factions in both firms while we increase b1. Figure
3 reports by how much total surplus increases (compared to the original eFUNE without
welfare maximizers) as a function of the bargaining weight of welfare maximizers (b1)
for several values of the externality intensity γ. We obtain the following results:
• Whatever the value of b1 > 0, the gain in surplus is always positive and is larger
when the externality intensity γ is bigger. Moreover, the marginal gain in surplus
(∂W/∂b1) also increases with the value of γ.
• The surplus gain increases monotonically with b1 if the externality intensity is
large enough (γ ≥ 1/4), so that the maximum gain in surplus is attained when
the welfare-maximizing faction has all the bargaining power inside the high quality
firm.
• If externality intensity is low enough (γ = 0 in Figure 3), the gain in surplus
reaches a maximum and then decreases slightly. The maximum gain in surplus is
attained for b1 = 0.78 when γ = 0.
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Figure 3: Increases in surplus as a function of b1 for several values of γ.
• Whatever the value of γ ∈ [0, 1], the quality of both goods and the market share
of the low quality good increase with b1. The high quality level and the fraction
of people consuming the low quality good are always lower than their optimal
level. As for the low quality level, it is lower than its optimal level, except when
γ is very low (zero in Figure 3) and b1 large (b1 > 0.28). In other words, in the
case where γ is low, the lowest quality level is driven above its optimal value as
the welfare-maximizers bargaining power increases. This may in turn explain why
surplus decreases when b1 is large enough and γ = 0.7
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
We summarize in the following Result:
Result 4 Government’s participation in the high quality firm is more desirable (i.e.,
increases more total surplus) when the externality intensity is larger. If this intensity
7Observe that q2 reaches its optimal level for b1 = 0.28 while total surplus decreases only when b1 is
pushed above 0.78.
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Figure 4: Efficiency as a function of b1 for several values of γ.
is low enough, maximum surplus is attained for partial nationalization (b1 < 1) while
full nationalization (b1 = 1) is called for in the other cases. Increasing b1 results in
increases in both quality levels and in the proportion of people buying the low quality
good. The low quality level overshoots its optimal level when individuals do not care
for the average quality of good (γ = 0) and when the bargaining power of the welfare
maximizers is large enough.
We now put these surplus gains in perspective by looking at how the efficiency
of any FUNE-G1 equilibrium (measured as previously as the ratio of the equilibrium
surplus to the maximum, Pareto efficient, surplus), evolves with the welfare maximizers’
bargaining weight b1 for several values of γ (see Figure 4).
[Insert Figure 4 around here]
We obtain the following results:
• When the bargaining weight of the welfare maximizers b1 is close to zero, efficiency
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is decreasing with the externality intensity γ: the more people care for the average
good quality, the less efficient the “laissez faire” FUNE allocation.
• The ranking is reversed for sufficiently high values of b1: the efficiency of FUNE-G1
with powerful welfare-maximizers increases when people care more for the average
good quality.
• Whatever the value of the externality intensity, the government taking a partici-
pation in the high quality firm never allows to reach the Pareto efficient allocation.
The gain in surplus from this participation, measured as a proportion of the max-
imum attainable surplus rather than in absolute terms as in Figure 3, increases
with the externality intensity.
We summarize in the following Result:
Result 5 The gain in efficiency (measured as the ratio of equilibrium surplus to maxi-
mum attainable surplus) when the government takes a participation in the high quality
firm increases with the externality intensity. If the bargaining weight of the welfare max-
imizers is low, the efficiency of FUNEs decreases with the externality intensity, while
it increases if b1 is large enough. Neither partial nor total nationalization of the high
quality firm allows to attain the Pareto efficient surplus level.
7 Should the government invest in the low quality firm?
Up to now, we have assumed that the government invests in the high quality firm. One
can wonder why this should be so, and whether a better result in terms of efficiency
would not be reached if the government invested in the firm offering the low quality
good.
Formally, we are looking for FUNE-G2 – i.e., FUNEs with a welfare-maximizing
faction in firm 2 but none in firm 1, when γ = 1.8 We proceed as in the two previous
sections: we start from the eFUNE, keep constant the relative bargaining weights of
the revenue- and profit-maximizing factions in both firms and compute the FUNE with
8The formal definition is similar to Definition 4 and is left to the reader.
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Figure 5: Efficiency of FUNE-G2 as a function of b2.
government intervention as a function of the bargaining weight of the welfare maximizers
(b2 here). We obtain that a FUNE-G2 exists for all values of the bargaining weight of
the welfare-maximizing faction b2 ∈ [0, 1]. These FUNE-G2 differ strikingly from the
case where the government invests in firm 1:
• the quality offered by both firms decreases monotonically and moves away from
the optimal qualities: q1 decreases from 48.4 to 36.7 when b2 goes from 0 to 1 (the
optimal value of q1 is 220) while q2 decreases from 40.5 to 33.7 (while the optimal
value of q2 is 103.6);
• the proportion of people buying the low quality good decreases (from 37.5% for
b1=0 to 29.3% for b1 = 1) and moves away from the optimal proportion, 85.8%;
• the efficiency of the FUNE-G2 decreases monotonically, from 56% to 46% (see
Figure 5).
[Insert Figure 5 around here]
We summarize all this in the next Result:
21
Result 6 As the bargaining weight of the welfare maximizing faction in the low qual-
ity firm increases, the efficiency of the corresponding FUNE-G2 allocation decreases
monotonically, with the qualities of both goods decreasing and moving away from their
optimal levels, while the proportion of people buying the low quality good decreases and
also moves away from its optimal level.
We then obtain a kind of paradox, where increasing the bargaining weight of the
welfare maximizers in the low quality firm actually decreases the overall efficiency of the
FUNE allocation! Although welfare maximizers should increase the low level quality
in order to increase the efficiency of the allocation, the strategic interactions between
firms lead to the opposite result.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have looked at competition between two firms providing differentiated
goods when individuals care for the average quality of the goods supplied and when firms
are composed of various factions whose objectives differ. As such, this analysis belongs to
the mixed oligopoly literature, which studies competition between firms whose objectives
differ. Our main assumptions are that firms are composed of both profit and revenue
maximizers, and that these two factions bargain with each other when choosing price
and quality of the good their firm is offering. An equilibrium allocation, called Firm
Unanimity Nash Equilibrium (FUNE), corresponds to a Nash equilibrium between firms
when factions inside each firm bargain efficiently.
Using numerical simulations, we first show that there is a two-dimensional manifold
of FUNEs, each characterized by the relative bargaining weight of the revenue maximiz-
ers in each firm. The normative properties of FUNEs are bad, with qualities provided
being too low and too many consumers buying the high quality good. We then open
the bargaining power “black box” and provide an explanation as to how their value is
determined. Providing such an explanation has an obvious interest by itself, and also
allows us to narrow down the set of equilibria and indeed to obtain unicity. Our next
step is then to introduce public intervention in the form of the government taking a
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participation in one firm. We assume that participation introduces a third faction in
this firm, whose objective is to maximize total surplus. We first look at intervention
in the high quality firm, and obtain that efficiency is monotonically increasing with
the bargaining weight of the welfare maximizing faction when the externality intensity
if large enough. This calls for total nationalization of the high quality firm. On the
other hand, when the externality intensity is small enough, efficiency is first increas-
ing and then decreasing with the welfare maximizers’ bargaining weight. This would
then call for partial nationalization of the high quality firm. On the other hand, we
obtain strikingly different results when the government takes a participation in the low
quality firm, since efficiency is monotonically decreasing with the welfare maximizers’
bargaining weights. This last result is reminiscent of White (2002), who shows that one
should manipulate the objective of the public firm (in a duopoly where this firm faces
a profit-maximizing private firm) in order to reach a better allocation. For instance,
instructing the public firm to maximize welfare is not the objective that will actually
maximize the welfare level of the equilibrium duopoly allocation.
The approach used in this paper could be extended in several directions. First, we
concentrate on one form of government intervention, namely the introduction of welfare-
maximizers in one firm’s board of directors. It would be interesting to contrast this with
other, more light handed, forms of regulations such as price caps for instance. Second,
we have assumed that the government faction maximizes welfare. In the light of White
(2002) and of our results with public intervention in the low quality firm, it might be
interesting to allow for other objectives for the faction appointed by the government,
even with a benevolent government. Third, we have abstracted from many shortcomings
of the government taking a participation in one firm, like incentive issues or financial
expenditures associated with this policy when the cost of public fund is large. We have
done this in order to focus on whether there is a case to be made for such a public
intervention in the most favorable setting. We have seen that the answer is not always
positive, at least when the low quality firm is concerned. Introducing incentive issues
would obviously restrict the set of parameters for which taking a participation in the
high quality firm is desirable.
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Appendix
Proof. of Proposition 1
Equate the right hand sides of the first order conditions for firm 1 (equations (2)
and (3)):
1− F (λ∗)− [p1 − c(q1)] f(λ∗)∂λ
∗
∂p1
F (λ∗)− 1 + p1f(λ∗)∂λ
∗
∂p1
=
−c0(q1) (1− F (λ∗))− [p1 − c(q1)] f(λ∗)∂λ
∗
∂q1
p1f(λ∗)∂λ
∗
∂q1
.
Manipulating this equation reduces it to
c(q1)
q1 − q2
λ∗ = c0(q1)
µ
p1
q1 − q2
− 1− F (λ
∗)
f(λ∗)
¶
. (11)
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Proceeding in like manner for firm 2, we obtain
−c(q2)
q1 − q2
λ∗ = c0(q2)
µ
F (λ∗)
f(λ∗)
− p2
q1 − q2
¶
. (12)
Using the fact that
c(q)
c0(q)
=
q
r
,
and dividing equation (11) by c0(q1) and equation (12) by c0(q2), and then adding the
equations gives
λ∗
r
= λ∗ +
2F (λ∗)− 1
f(λ∗)
.
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